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THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT SHOULD NOT BE
AMENDED
FREDERICK K. BEUTELt
From the time the Negotiable Instruments Act was first recommended
for adoption it has been the fashion among legal writers to advocate various
amendments to and changes in the Act. These suggestions take numerous
forms. Some propose .to throw out the entire basic theory of negotiable
instruments and re-examine the postulates upon which the Act is based.'
Others desire only changes in individual sections which range from minute
variations in particular verbiage to general alterations of the whole groups of
sections.2  Still others seek the repeal of important portions of the Act.3
In spite of this persistent demand for amendments it is the purpose of
this paper to suggest that the N.I.L. should not be amended. The writer
does not contend that the Act is theoretically perfect or that at some future
time amendments may not be exceedingly useful, but rather that at present
any attempt to change the Act itself is ill'timed, inadvisable, and unnecessary.
In attempting to do this it will not be either possible or profitable to examine
in detail all of the legion of suggested amendments. Since such a discussion
is bound to become enmeshed in minute details which obscure the major
t A. B., i2i, Cornell University; LL. B., 1925, S. J. D., 1928, Harvard University;
Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor o.f Law,
Tulane University; member of Washington and Pennsylvania bars; author of BusINEsS
PRoBLE s IN THE LAW OF AGENCY (1926), CASE PRoBILES AND TESTS IN BUSINESS LAW
(1929), editor of BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. in press), and con-
tributor to numerous legal periodicals.
'See Francis, Do Some of the Major Postulates of the Law of Bills and Notes Need
Re-examinationf-(I928) 14 CORN. L. Q. 41; see also Vernier, Amendments to the Nego-
iable Instruments Law (1929) 24 ILL. L. REv. 150, 151-152, suggesting entire revision of the
act.
2 Suggested amendments will be found in the following places: BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW (Chafee's 4th ed. 1926) pp. v, 69, 8o, 102, 286, 311, 320, 326, 338, 361,
410, 420, 512, 592, 599, 6Io, 630, 645, 675, 723 to 725, 742, 755, 830, 838, 842, 884; Bran-
nan, Some Necessary Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments, Law (1913) 26 HARv. L.
RrV. 493, 494, 5oo; Britton, Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Negotiable thstruments
Law (1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 815; Dickinson, Amending our Negotiable Instruments Law
(1928) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 326; Puttkammer, Further Amendnents to the Negotiable Instru-
Rents Law (1928) 23 IL. L. REv. 73; Turner, Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amend-
ments to the Negotiable Instruments Law (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1O47; Turner, Revision
of the Negotiable Instrunients Law (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 25; Vernier, Amendments to the
Negotiable Instruments Law (1929) 24 IL. L. REv. ISo, and numerous authorities there
cited.
'Repeal of §§ 40 and 47 has been recommended by committees of the conference, see
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CO.MMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
(1928) 185; PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COaMissmroxs Ox UNIFORM
STATE LAWS (1931) 29; Professor Brannan's suggestion for amendment to sections 119 and
12o removes the law of suretyship from the act, see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW, 725 et seq. See also Hening, The UnifornA Negotiable Instruinents Law (1gii) 59
U. OF PA. L. REV. 471, 532, suggesting repeal of §§ r4, 62; AMEs, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW (1900) 14 HARv. L. REv. 241, 244 et seq. recommending repeal of §§ 3 (2), and
137, 119 (4), 120 (3), (5) and (6).
(368)
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principles involved, this paper will devote itself to the motives, purposes and
theories behind the proposed amendments and will attempt to show that they
are not in accord with the major policies of uniform legislation.
The Theories and Purposes Behind the N.I.L.
Before discussing the proposed amendments it might be well to recapit-
ulate briefly the reasons why the Negotiable Instruments Act came into
existence.
One should, keep clearly in mind that at the time the Uniform Laws
Commission was started there was a complete breakdown in the common law
of negotiable instruments. The decisions in the various states were in
irreconcilable conflict and' many of. the established doctrines of the law were
out of line with commercial practice. 4  This condition constituted such a
burden upon commerce that the Arherican Bar Association felt itself driven
to the necessity of drafting uniform laws.
8
The Negotiable Instruments Act was the first of a series of attempts to
alleviate the difficulties growing out of the conflicting decisions by reducing
the commercial law to a written code. The objectives to be attained were
certainty of rule of law, achievement of uniformity by removal of conflicting
decisions, alignment of law with new commercial practices, and the creation
of a new legal basis upon which courts, jurists and businesi men could rely.'
The success of such a project necessarily involved scrapping of great
quantities of the conflicting common law of various jurisdictions, the repeal
of numerous local statutes and a change in some of the basic common law
theories of negotiability. 7 Out of this effort'it was hoped that harmony in
the decisions and a uniform commercial practice would result. Unfortu-
nately, the courts have not immediately fallen in line with the purpose of the
Act and many conflicting decisions are still to be overruled." This temporary
failure to achieve uniformity has carried with it a certain disillusionment,
'See OGDEN, NEaoTiABLE IN STRUMENTS (3d ed. 1931)' 1o; Jones, Uniformity of Laws
through National and Interstate Codification (1894) 7 VA. B. A. REP. 157, 162 et seq., re-
printed in part (1894) 11 BANKING L. J. 137;'Lapp, Uniform State Legislation (1gIo)" 4
Am. Por
- Sci. REv. 576; Tompkins, The Necessity for Uniformity in the Laws, Governing
Commercial Paper (i89o) 13 A. B. A. REP. 247; Wheeler, The Necessity for Uniform
Laws Governing Commercial Paper in the United States (x896) 13 BANKING L. .694.
. 'Snyder, The Problem of Uniform Legislation in the United States (1892) 15 A. B. A;
REP. 287, 307 to 309; see Report of Committee on Uniform State Laws (i8gi) 14 A. B. A.
REP. 365, and material there cited; and see the excellent discussion by Eaton, Uniformity
in Judicial Decisions Arising undcr the Negotiable Instruments Act (1913) 12 MICH. 
L.
REv. 89.
'Brewster, The Promotion of Uniform Legislation (1897) 6 YALE L. J. 132; Uniform-
ity of State Laws (1911) 23 GrEN BAG 653.
"For a number of these changes for the better see Ames, op. cit. supra note 3, at 241,
242-244; Chafe% in BRAl'xA1, op. cit. supra note 2, at vii, viii.
sThe seriousness of this attitude of the courts is discussed in detail in another article,
see Beutel, Necessity of a New Technique it Interpreting the N. I. L. (1931) 6 TuLANE L.
RE. I.
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and has become a starting point for numerous suggestions for amendment
to the Act.9
Disputes on What and How to Codify
Even before the Act was adopted in many jurisdictions, disputes arose
among the authorities on what and how to codify. Some experts disagreed
with the Commission on which of the conflicting rules of law should have
been adopted to cover particular cases. Often the critics preferred a rule
which the Commission had rejected instead of the one actually adopted.
Dean Ames' suggested amendments to sections 9-3, 20, 4o, 65, 66, 70, 119-4,
175 and 186,10 are illustrations of this point of view.
Others agreed with the rules of law but disagreed with the Commission
on how to codify, preferring one manner of statement of the law rather than
another, though both reached substantially the same result. Numerous
changes of this type have been advocated." One of the best examples is
Professor Williston's suggested amendment to section 23, which reads as
follows:
"Where the signature of a person is forged or made without author-
ity it is inoperative to render him liable or to transfer his rights under
the instrument unless he is precluded from setting up the forgery or
want of authority." 12
Whereas the original Act reads:
"When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the
person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and
no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge thereof, or to
enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired
through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is
sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery
or want of authority." "
The Williston amendment has been justified on the grounds that it would
make the forger liable as an indorser 14 or personally liable on the instru-
9 For example, see Hening, op. cit. supra note 3, at 471, 532.
10 Ames, op. cit. supra note 3, at 241, 246 et seq.
' Dean Ames himself places most of his own objections in this category, see iid. 244,
and see also Vernier, op. cit. supra note 2, at 157 et seq.
I See HANDBOOK OF NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1928) 183;
ibid. (1927) 624. The italics indicate the amendment.
"Cf. the latest proposed amendment, which reads as follows:
"When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose sig-
nature it purports to be, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge
thereof, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through
or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such
right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority."
PROGRAM OF NAT. CONF. OF COMa!'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1931) 27.
" See HANDBOK OF NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM SATE LAWS (1927) 630; ibid.
(1928) 191. The draftsman evidently overlooked the fact that so far as the forgery of the
maker's signature is concerned the result he desires is now reached by § 65, and could also
be achieved on analogy to this section in the case of the forged indorsement.
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ment,15 overlooking section I8, which provides that, with certain exceptions,
of which this is not one, no person is liable on the instrument unless his
signature appears thereon. 6
A third group of suggested amendments grows out of a fundamental
disagreement with the Commission on the policy of codification. The Com-
mission chose the policy of codifying the entire law of negotiability. The
critics desired only partial codification. Thus, many authorities, led by Pro-
fessor Chafee, took the position that the Act shbuld not attempt to codify all
of the law of negotiable instruments, but should follow the British Act in
including only the law of notes, checks and drafts and leaving out other types
of commercial paper.17 These authorities attempted to argue that this was
the proper interpretation of the Act '8 in spite of the broad wording of
Article I, which seems clearly to include all types of negotiable instruments.
When the courts followed the literal meaning of the Act 9 and gave it the
broad interpretation, numerous amendments were immediately suggested.20
The first of these three types ot objections involved simply a choice
between two rules of law, both of which have some semblance of justice and
judicial support.2 1 Since one has been chosen, as a matter of policy it should
not be disturbed unless great hardship on the parties involved or some major
business dislocation has resulted. In the absence of such facts, which as yet
have not been presented, the rule of.law chosen should not be changed, and
this type of amendment is worthless.
The second type of suggested amendments, growing out of a disagree-
ment on how to express the rule of law, is also unnecessary. If the rule of
law intended by the Commission can be determined from the statute, the
precise wording is of no great importance, especially in absence of proof that
the amendment is dearly better than the original. The fact that such amend-
ments are not substantial improvements is shown by the complete disagree-
Slightly different reasons are given by the latest committee, see PROGRAM OF NAT. CONF.
OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (931) 41; note also the changes in wording of foot-
note 13 supra.
Many of the other amendments suggested by Professor Williston's committee are of
an equally trivial nature, see the proposed amendments to §§ 6, 16, 52, 53, 70, 110. i6o, and 186,
HANDBOO I OF NAT. CONF. OF CoMM'Rs ON UNIFORM1 STATE LAws (1928) 182 et seq., and
many of these and similar amendments retained in the present committee's recommendations;
see PROGRAM OF NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1931) 25 et seq.
"I See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 5 et seq.
"8Ibid. 7.
See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTs LAW (Beutel's 5th ed. in press) § I "In
General" and cases there cited.
2' The amendments to §§ 1, 5, 6 of the act as proposed by Professor Williston's commit-
tee are inserted for this purpose; see HANDEOOK OF NAT. CONF. OF CoMm'Rs ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws (1928) i9o; so also the amendments to §§ I, 2, 3, 4 and 5 proposed by the pre-
sent committee, see PROGRAM OF NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1931)
37 et seq.; Vernier, op. cit. supra note 2, at 15o, 153, and authorities there cited; cf. (1918)
6 CAL. L. REv. 444, 448; Note (193o) 4o YALE L. J. 261.
2 See Brewster, Uniform State Laws (1898) 21 A. B. A. REP. 315, 322.
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ment among those suggesting changes of this sort on the particular words to
be used.
22
The third objection, that the Commission adopted too broad a policy of
codification, seems also to be untenable. It must be kept in mind that the
common law has failed and is still failing properly to solve these commercial
problems. Codification has been the only remedy; therefore, broad codifica-
tion, unless it is working irreparable hardships, is to be preferred to the
narrow type of statute because it removes more of the difficulties from the
common law.
The objection that broad codification is causing rigidity and restricting
the development of the law will be dealt with later.
Partial Codification
Many of the difficulties attributed to the N.I.L. are due to the fact that
it is necessarily a partial codification. When the Commission on Uniform
Laws undertook to codify the law of negotiable instruments it was faced
immediately with a very complicated problem. It is a truism that every field
or subject in the law touches upon ever r other field or subject. So close is
this contact that it was impossible to codify the law of bills and notes without
including or touching upon questions of contracts, agency, corporations and
many other branches of the law. How much to codify, then, becomes a diffi-
cult problem; the sort of problem to which there is no satisfactory answer.
Probably no two persons would draw the line at the same place, and no matter
what particular subjects were included or left out trouble would surely follow.
Where the legal structure of a people contains within itself two different
types of law springing from different theories as to the nature of law and
requiring different methods of interpretation and application to a given set
of facts, it is not surprising that conflicts should develop along the border
line. Many of the gravest difficulties arising under the N.I.L. are due to
this inevitable conflict between common law and written law. Where shall
the statute be extended in derogation of the common law, and where shall the
common law be extended to limit the statute? The answers to these questions
have caused much trouble in problems involving agency,23 capacity, 24 ille-
gality,2 5 suretyship and many other subjects with an increasing flood of
suggested amendments.
'Cf. Dean Ames' suggestions, op. cit. supra note 3, at 244 et seq.; Williston's sug-
gestions, HANDBOOK OF NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS ON" UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1928) i8o et
seq.; Britton. op. cit. supra note 2, at 815; Vernier, op. cit. supra note 2, at I5O; Turner,
Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 25; the proposals of the
present committee, PROGRAM OF NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (193 i )
22; see also supra note 20.
' See Beutel, The Liability of an Unauthorized Agent on an Instrument Signed in the
Name of His Principal (1931) 5 TULANE L. REv. 281.
' See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 179 to 182, 546 to 548; see suggested amend-
ments Vernier, op. cit. supra note 2, at 150, 158. -
' Note the unsatisfactory condition of the cases under § 55, BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note
2, at 419 to 42o, 428 to 44x, and the suggestions for revival of real defenses by amendment;
Hening, op. cit. supra note 3, at 471, 491 et seq.; Vernier, op. cit. supra note z, at 15o, 162.
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Most of the amendments offered at the last meeting of- the Commission
on Uniform Laws, to the title of the Act and sections I, 2, and 5,26 are simply
a retreat from the position taken by the original Act that the entire law of
negotiability should -be codified. These amendments, like Professor Bran-
nan's suggested amendments to sections i I9 and 12o deleting the law of
suretyship from the Act,2 7 are not particularly helpful because they simply
throw vexatious problems out of the law covered by the Act and back into
the common law where they would again become subject to the unsatisfactory
conflicts which caused the original enactment of the code. 28  New conflicts
also would be certain to develop along the new border line thus created be-
tween common law and written law. This policy of amendment, carried to
its logical conclusion, would amount to the ultimate repeal of the Act with
the reappearance of the intolerable conditions which it was enacted to prevent.
Failure to Appreciate the Nature of Codified Law and Its Relation to Court
Decisions
Many of the suggested amendments have grown out of a failure to
appreciate the nature of codified law. We have become so accustomed to
speak of a court decision as the "law on the point" that we often fail to
realize that when the common law is reduced to a code a radical change
takes place in the form of the law and the function of the court decision.
When the law is codified it is no longer to be found in the decisions and the
ratio decidendi flowing therefrom. A code statute unlike the ordinary statute
familiar to the common-law lawyer is not an exception to the law to be nar-
rowly construed. It contains within itself an embodiment of the law on the
subject which it covers. Therefore its words are to'be given a broad mean-
ing rather than a strict construction, and when the plain meaning of the
words does not cover a point then they are to be used as examples of princi-
ples of law which are deduced from the code itself and not from previous
cases.
In this state of the law it is clear that the court decisions under the
N.I.L. are not law but are mere applications of the law to certain sets of facts
and as such must necessarily lose much of their former force. After a case
is decided the law is still found in the code and not in the cases. 29  If the
court has, either by error or intention, decided a case contrary to the plain
meaning or proper interpretation of the statute the law has not been changed
and amendments are unnecessary. This is especially true in those instances
where the courts ignore the N.I.L. or twist its meaning to suit their own
' See PRoGRAM OF NAT. CONF. OF COmm'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (I931) 22 to 24,
37 to 38.
" See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 72o to 725.
'See Turner's criticism to this effect in (1928) 38 YAI L. J. at 47 et seq.
Cf. Frank, Are Judges Human? (1931) 8o U. OF PA. L. Rr.v. 17, 223.
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ideas of justice in a particular case. 3° This deity complex on the part of
some courts which causes them to decide cases on their own "judicial hunch"
in the teeth of the plain meaning of statutes has been condemned by much
abler writers. It is sufficient to say here that the cure for such difficulties,
in so far as they affect the N.I.L., does not lie in amendments to the Act; the
argument is to the court and not to the legislature. Where there is a basic
codified law, erroneous court decisions merely misapply and do not misstate
or change the law. This principle is well recognized by the courts themselves
and it is not uncommon to find them reversing previous decisions on the
ground that they were based upon unsound interpretation or contrary to the
weight of authority under the Act.
In light of these principles, amendments which have as their sole purpose
removing conflicting decisions such as those on the question of the payee as
a holder in due course,31 the effect of "as per contract" on negotiability and
the like are unnecessary. 32  If the proper intent of the Act is clear or can
be ascertained by the application of sound principles of statutory interpre-
tation the courts themselves soon rectify the difficulties.3" As a practical
matter it should be noted also that it is niuch easier to get a court to reverse
itself than to have an amendment passed by over fifty legislative bodies.
Hostile Interpretation, Ignoring Established Rules of Statutory Construction
One very fruitful source of unnecessary amendments has been a certain
hostility to the Act as shown in the failure of critics and courts alike to apply
well established rules of statutory interpretation. There is a sort of distrust
of written law on the part of common law lawyers and writers and a tendency
to glorify the common law. The usual excuse given is that statutes are the
rigid work of bungling legislators while the common law is the embodiment
of principles of justice and right. Statutes are expected to be poorly drawn
while court decisions are the work of experts. This attitude has had a
marked influence on the articles and comments written in the field of bills and
notes since the enactment of the N.I.L. Most of the scholars approach the
For a summary of this tendency and extent to which it has been carried, see Beutel,
op. cit. supra note 8.
' For example, see suggested amendments to §§ i6, 3o and 52, PROGRAM OF NAT. CONF.
OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1931) 26 to 29, 40 to 43; and HANDBOOK OF NAT.
CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1928) 183, 184, i81, 191. 192.
1See (1929) 4 TuT.ANE L. REv. 126.
'It should be noted that on the question of payee as a holder in due course alone the
courts of six states changed their position between i924 and i93o, Washington courts flatly
overruled previous contradecisions to hold the payee a holder in due course, while the courts
in Iowa, Kentucky, Oklahoma and North Carolina changed their position in this direction by
deciding cases irreconcilable with previous decisions to the contrary. Texas courts on the
other hand seem to have reversed their former affirmative stand. Cf. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW (Beutel's 5th ed. in press) § 52, "Payee as a holder in due course", with
ibid. (Chafee's 4th ed.) 261 to 369. This tendency will be examined at length in a later
paper.
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Act on a sort of defect hunt. They take great delight in exposing apparent
defects. Under this critical treatment every possible ambiguity is likely to
develop into a conflict between sections, a hiatus in the Act, or a bungling bit
of codification which has failed properly to state the law. Having thus
exposed the inadequacies of the Act the critic is enabled to retire into the
realm of pure and undefined common law to work out the principles of the
justice involved in his particular problem. When these have been discovered
in the common law, or the critics idealization thereof, amendments to correct
the Act are usually forthcoming.
This approach to the N.I.L. overlooks the fundamental facts that it is
the product of the most expert organ of legislation yet assembled in this
country,34 and the basic fact that the common law in this field at least, far
from being in the ideal state usually pictured, was in such a state of collapse
that codification was forced upon an unwilling bench and bar by the sheer
weight of necessity.
When the simplest principles of statutory construction are applied to
the Act some of the suggested amendments, which have been seriously advo-
cated by men entitled to the greatest respect, are open to the charge of ill
considered and hasty draftsmanship. For example, it is a well-settled rule
of statutory construction that a statute must be read as a whole to determine
its meaning. Ambiguities or omissions in the subject matter of one part of
the Act are to be supplied by references to other sections.35 Yet in spite of
this rule the Commission on Uniform Laws has had before it for consider-
ation the following amendment to section 52:36 "A holder in due course is a
payee or other holder who has taken the instrument . . ." when section 191
of the present Act provides: "Holder means payee . . ." Many other
equally futile amendments have been proposed.37
See MacChesney, Uniformn State Laws (1916) IL.T STATE B. A. RE,. 399, 430 et seq.;
What the Commissioners m Uniform Laws are Doing for the People of the United States
(1912) 75 CENT. L. J. i. This number contains other interesting articles and material about
the work of the Conference.
"'BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (2d ed. 1911) 23, 242; see also DWARIs, CON-
sTRUcTI N OF STATUTES (Potter's ed. 1885) 128 citing Vattel, 136 citing Rutherford, 140
citing Domat, 144 the so-called American Rules, 12.
1 The section now reads: "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instru-
ment ... " See Mr. Brannan's able comment, BRANNAN, op. cit. su~pra note 2, at 123 et
seq.
I The Conference Committee in 1928 proposed the following amendment to § 110;
"Where a waiver of presentment, protest or dishonor is embodied in the instrument it is
binding upon all parties . . :' adding presentment, protest or dishonor to the general term
waiver in spite of the fact that these matters were already covered by §§ 82 (3), 111 and 159;
cf. also § 5 (3).
The same committee also recommended that § 16o be changed as follows: "When an
instrument is lost or destroyed or wrongly detained from the person entitled to hold it, pro-
test may be made on a copy or written particulars thereof" substituting "instrument" for
bill, but such a change was not necessary in light of §§ 118, 129 and 152.
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So also it is elementary that sections of the same statute should never
be given conflicting meanings where they can be reconciled.38 But in spite
of this simple rule of common sense in statutory interpretation there has been
talk of conflict between sections 9 (5) and 40 39 with the seriously considered
repeal of section 40;'0 this, regardless of the fact that one of. the framers of
the Act almost thirty years ago, pointed out the true meaning of these sec-
tions 41 which has now been adopted by the Commission 42 and seems to have
been. the business understanding of the law merchant from the beginning. 43
It should be noted here that it is to the credit of the Commission that
the progress of amendments of this sort has been exceedingly slow. It is also
either a great credit to the N.I.L., or a discredit to its opponents, that it
has weathered this sort of adverse criticism with only thirty-one suggested
amendments approved for preliminary considerations by the Committee of
the Conference.
44
Fortunately, many courts have refused to adopt a hostile attitude
towards the Act and some of the greatest difficulties found in the sections
by the writers and suggestors of amendments are being satisfactorily ironed
out by reference to other sections of the Act. A few examples will show the
possibilities of the trend of judicial interpretation in this direction. The
alleged difficulty with section 29, which seems to give a holder for value not
a holder in due course greater rights against an accommodation maker than
he would have against an ordinary maker 45 has been satisfactorily cured in
a decision of the Court of Appeals of California 46 by reference to sections
So also the same committee suggested changing § 186 adding, "and notice of dishonor
must be given to the drawer as provided in the case of bills of exchange" when the present
act provides, § 185 "Except as herein otherwise provided the provisiofns of this act applicable
to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a check"; and see § 61. This is apparently
an inartistic method of meeting Dean Ames' criticism of this section, see op. cit. supra note
3, at 256. Dean Ames' second criticism of § 49, see ibid. 250, arises from this same sort of
perversity. To reach his conclusion one must interpolate "only" into § 49 and ignore §§ 29,
51 and 191.
' BLAc , op. cit. supra note 35, at 322, 325; DwaRusS, op. cit. supra note 35, at 132 cit-
ing Pu'ffendorf, 144 American Rules, 5 and 12.
' See Brannan, op. cit. supra note 2, at 102, 294, 326 and numerous authorities there
cited.
4e See HANKBoo OF NAT. CONF. OF COM-'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1928) 185, 192.
"Under this interpretation section 40 applies only to an instrument originally payable to
bearer while the case of an instrument payable to order and indorsed in blank is governed by
88 9 (5) and 34. Eaton, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1qo4) 2 MICH. L. Ray. 260, 274.
"See the report of the committee on amendments, PROGRAM OF NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS
OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1931) 19.
"See Turner, A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amendntents to the Negotiable
Instruments Law (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1O5O et seq.; see also supra notes 41 and 42.
"See PROGRAM OF NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1931) 22 to 37.
'See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 286 et seq., and authorities there cited.
"'Pacific Southwest Trust and Savings Bank v. Valley Finance Corp., 99 Cal. App. 728,
279 Pac. 222 (1q29), rehearing denied 280 Pac. 134 (1929).
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16,47 52 48 and 58 40 which sections seem clearly to make. the above result
impossible, and such is now the great weight of authority. 50
So also the problem of the liability, under section 20, of an unauthorized
agent who signs his principal's name to an instrument, which has caused so
much discussion among the writers,-5 has been successfully solved by Judge
Cardozo in New Georgia Bank v. Lippman 52 by reference to the expressed
intent of the framers and to the social desirability of the result.53
If writers in the field had used half the ingenuity in finding sensible
solutions of problems within the N.I.L. that they have exerted in limiting
its scope and exposing its defects, it is submitted that the group of suggested
amendments would now be decreased by at least two-thirds, the science of
obtaining justice under written law in America would be much further ad-
vanced, and the state of the decisions would be in a far more satisfactory
condition.
Pressure of Organized Interests Behind Amendments
Though the most obvious source of suggested amendments to the Act
has been the writings of legal scholars, it is by no means the only source.
The influence of organized interests, which are affected by the Act, is also
an important factor to be reckoned with. Proposed amendments coming from
this source should be subjected to more careful scrutiny than any others be-
cause they approach the problems from a certain self-interested bias. Al-
though it seldom comes to light in the form of direct publicity or articles in
law reviews,54 anyone closely connected with the Uniform Laws Commission
or any legislative body will testify that the bankers, brokers, exporters and
trade associations exert a constant and powerful influence, even in the draft-
' "As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in
due course . . . the delivery may be shown to have been . . . for a special purpose
only."
"A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following
conditions: . . .
(2) That he become a holder before it was overdue.
(4) That . . . he had no notice of infirmity in the instrument or defect of title of
the person negotiating it."
See also § 55 defining a negotiation in breach of faith as a defect of title.
" "In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument
is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable."
I Rylee v. Wilkerson, 134 Miss. 663, 99 So. 901 (1924) ; Weiser Nat. Bank v. Peters,
x74 Ark. 984, 298 S. W. 878 (1927) ; Bartels v. Suter, 130 Okla. 7, 266 Pac. 753 (1928) ;
Wilhoit v. Seavall, 121 Kan. 239, 246 Pac. 13 (1926), Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1273, 1280;
Dittmeir Real Estate Co. v. Knox, 259 S. W. 835 (Mo. App. 1924) ; Comimky v. Coleman
114 N. Y. Supp. 875 (19o9) ; Comstock v. Buckley, 141 Wis. 228, 124 N. W. 414 (91o) ; cf.
Marling v. Jones, 138 Wis. 82, ii N. V. 931 (igog), criticized in (igog) 57 U. OF PA. L,
Rxv. 662.
"See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2 at 163-164, and authorities there cited.
5M249 N. Y. 3o7, 164 N. E. 108 (1928).
' See summary principles of statutory interpretation involved in this and other decisions
of this court. Beutel, op. cit. supra note 23.
For a general summary of this pressure on legislatures see Beutel, The Pressure of
Organized Interests as a Factor in Shaping Legislation (1929) 3 So. CQ..LI L. REV. io an4
authorities and statutes there cited.
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ing and passage of Uniform Legislation. The bankers alone are so powerful
that the Chairman of the Committee on Amendments was willing to recom-
mend a proposed amendment to section 62-2 5 on certified checks against his
better judgment in order to secure their help in passing the other proposed
amendments. 6
This particular amendment provides that where an instrument has been
altered before certification the bank is liable to a subsequent holder in due
course only for the original amount. This is not only contrary to the gen-
erally.accepted commercial law of the world and to commercial understanding
of certified checks;" but it throws upon subsequent innocent purchasers
of certified checks the risk of alteration which they could not possibly dig-
cover. The amendment has been suggested because the banks do not want
to be liable on their certification for more than they can collect from the
drawer.5 s The result is to discourage the use of certified checks by those
who know the law. Instead of asking for certification of checks the sophis-
ticated creditor will ask for bank drafts or cashier's checks, and the bank,
of course, will be liable .to the holder in due course on these instruments
according to their tenor even though they were issued in exchange for altered
paper. If then, this amendment is adopted, those who know the law will
not use certified checks, and the banks will profit only at the expense of the
innocent parties who still rely upon the commercial belief that the bank's
certified paper is as good as the bank itself. It is hard to see how the cause
of justice or the usefulness of the N.I.L. is to be advanced by amendments
which simply become a trap for the uninitiated.
Many others, of the proposed amendments, are open to the charge that
they are class legislation.59 Whatever may be the public spirited intention
' The amendment reads as follows: "2. Such person by accepting or certifying the in-
struinent engages to pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance; except that where the
instrument has been altered after issue, this engagement extends only to the order for which
the party ordering is answerable to the person required to pay."
'PROGRAM OF NAT. CONF. OF COMMa'RS ON UNIFORm STATE LAWS (193) 20-21.
'Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (1891) 4 HARV. L. RV. 297, 3o6-3o7.
Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 38 YAIX L. J. 25, 29-30.
The following amendments suggested by the committee at the last meeting of the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, see PROGRAM (1931) 22 et seq., offer decided economic
advantages to the creditor class at the expense of debtor:
Section 3, amending § 2: "The sum payable is certain . . . although it is to be paid:
. (6) With taxes, insurances or other charges relative to the instrument, the indebted-
ness evidenced by it, or the security for it." This would legalize and make negotiable all
those instruments which carry as part of the contract burdens and service charges, which
may, in a falling market, amount to economic strangulation, and provision throwing all the
expense of the transaction on the borrower. See also § 6 amending § 5 (5).
Section 4, amending § 3: "In the following cases the expression of particular conditions
or a summnary thereof with reference to a separate writing for a full statement of such con-
ditions shall not render the instrument non-negotiable. (2) Where the instrument is issued
and shown on its face to be issued as one of a series, and conditions are placed in the inter-
ests of holders as a group upon enforcement by indiidual holders." Opens the door to
squeezing out minorities, in advance where corporate securities are involved, and makes such
rights negotiable.
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of the associations or interests proposing such enactments, if amendments of
this nature are allowed to find their way to the law and the public at large
becomes cognizant of the fact, the cause of uniform legislation and the value
of the Uniform Laws Commission will be irreparably damaged.
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Failure to Realize the Difficulty and Effect of Amendments
Many of the proposed amendments which appear in complete form in
law review articles or are submitted to legislative bodies spring from an
over-confidence in the possibility of getting them passed and the failure to
realize the effect of their adoption. The process of getting amendments
through the Commission on Uniform Laws is necessarily a tedious one.
Such amendments must be carefully considered by committees, turned over to
experts for consideration, be given a hearing before the body itself and then
held over another year for consideration. After approval by the Commis-
sion there remains the Herculean task of getting the amendment adopted by
over fifty legislative bodies. This machinery should not be put in motion
whenever anybody gets a bright idea about a new possible improvement.
Neither is mere technical improvement sufficient justification, nor is the con-
viction that the Act would have been improved had it been adopted originally
in the amended form. Such amending power should be used only for basic
defects involving fundamental and far-reaching changes. All suggestions
should be held until their full effect may be realized.
In light of this situation amendments to the Act necessarily cannot be
attempted oftener than every twenty-five or fifty years.6 The slowness of
this process has caused some misguided enthusiasts to rush immediately to
legislative bodies which are willing to give a sympathetic ear to their propo-
sitions, and a large number of amendments have found their way into the
particular state laws simply because of this impatience.
6 2  Such amendments
are usually ill considered and fail to have the benefit of expert knowledge
which is available to the Commission itself. The result, without effecting
much improvement, is to destroy uniformity.
Sec. 12, amending § 37, and § 14 repealing § 47, are obviously a concession to collecting
banks, giving them much greater rights than under the present act. As suggested below, this
should be part of the new bank collection code.
Secs. 16 and 17, amending § 62 (see supra note 55) and creating a new § 62A, as shown
above, greatly increase the rights of the banks at the expense of holders of the instrument.
Sec. 2o, amending § 74: "The instrument must be exhibited to the person from whom
payment is demanded, . . . and when demanded, the signature, or other signed receipt of
the person receiving payment must be written on the instrument." Thus materially increas-
ing the rights of paying banks, see McCurdy v. The Society of Savings, 6 Ohio Dec. Rep.
1i69, Note (1882) 26 ALB. L. J. 61; CAMPBELL, CASES ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (1928)
275; cf. ibid. 278 and cases there cited.
0 See Eaton, op. cit. supra note 41, at 266, where the author points out the effective op-
position to the original act simply on the ground that it had the support of the Bankers'
Association.
6 See Britton, op. cit. supra note 2, at 832.
2 The West Virginia Code of 1931 contains over twenty such amendments, Illinois and
many other states have also fallen into this error, see Beutel, op. cit. supra note 8, and
authorities there cited.
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Even if the Uniform Laws Commission could be induced to approve
individual amendments more rapidly, the difficulty of getting them adopted
by all the state legislatures is a paramount obstacle which must be considered
It should be borne in mind that the idea of establishing uniform laws has
not been entirely popular. The attempt at codification was begun only after
much propaganda and has not achieved marked success. Other uniform laws
have failed of adoption even in the majority of the states.6 3 The Negotiable
Instruments Act is the one law which has inspired sufficient confidence and
support to be adopted by all of the legislators of this country. Even the
Sales Act, carrying with it the prestige of Professor Williston, has not been
able to equal its achievement.
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The desirability of uniform laws is still being weighed in the balance.
Many legislators would consider new amendments to the Negotiable Instru-
ments Act as a sign of weakness not only in that Act but in all uniform laws,
and the whole movement for uniform laws might be undermined badly by
any hasty attempt at amendment to the N.I.L. In this state of affairs no
amendments should be approved by the Commission unless there is a crying
need for their adoption and a unanimity of opinion among the authorities
as to the form which they should take.
It is extremely important to note in this connection that, in spite of
much adverse criticism, the N.I.L. has been very successful. No great need
for amendment seems to have arisen; and the amendments that have been
suggested, far from receiving unanimous support, have been the center of
such a controversy that the committees of the Commission itself have been
unable to agree on the form that they should take. 65
The Crystallization of Commercial Law and Related Acts
It should be borne in mind also that the law of negotiable instruments
under the Act, like the suggested amendments to it, has not yet crystallized
in the minds of the profession.
The present members of the Bench and Bar are men educated and
grounded in the common law tradition with little experience with codified
' An examination of the current edition of Uniform Laws Annotated will show that of
forty-seven statutes approved by the Commission only four have been passed by more than
half the states; these are the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (48) ; the Sales Act (30) ;
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act and the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, each passed
by 27.
'To date the Sales Act has been adopted in only thirty jurisdictions, see I U. L. 9
(1931) vii.
' See authorities supra note 22; cf. also the Williston committee's amendments, HAND-
OoN, NAT. CONF. OF CoMM'Rs oN UNIFORM STATE LAW (1928) i8o et seq. with those of Mr.
Llewellyn's committee, PROGRAM oF-NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
(1931) 22 et seq. and note that Mr. Llewellyn's committee not only disagrees with the Wil-
liston committee, but cannot agree among themselves on some of the most important of their
suggested amendments, ibid. 18-21, 26, 28, 31, 35, 42-53.
THE N.I.L. SHOULD NOT BE AMENDED 381
law. For years after the adoption of the Act, in many jurisdictions it was
ignored or misunderstood. For example, not until several recent decisions 66
has there been any apparent understanding of the sections of the Act per-
taining to value. Even more serious is the state of mind of the profession
on the question of the proper method of interpreting the Act and of applying
it to problems in its field. As has been pointed out elsewhere,"" there are
at least six or seven different and conflicting theories of interpretation now
flourishing in this country. In such a situation it is premature to discuss
proposed amendments before there is a general understanding as to what is
being amended and how the amendments are to be applied. Tampering with
the Act under present conditions is likely to lead only to further confusion.
The confusion within the field of the law of negotiable instruments itself
is even more marked, and is, to some extent, caused by the state of the law
in other closely related subjects. There is a strong movement to settle many
moot problems of commercial law by the adoption of carelessly drawn codes.
These statutes, aimed at particular situations which their framers hope to
remedy at once, are likely to lead to unexpected complications in other fields
where the law has already been reduced to writing. This has been apparent
in the hasty adoption of the many so-called bank collection codes.6 s Some
of these codes have practically destroyed the effect of the blank endorsement
where a bank is the indorsee, and other sections of the same act have greatly
altered the effect of restrictive indorsement. 9 Many related acts of this
nature are now being passed both with and without the approval of the Uni-
form Law Commission. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform
Bank Collection Act are examples of related uniform laws aimed at one par-
ticular subject which are changing the effect of sections of the Negotiable
Instruments Act."0
'This difficulty was apparent not only in the cases of pre-existing debt as value, see
BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 236-246, but also on the question of bank credits as value.
It was only within the last few years that courts began to see that such credit was clearly
value under § 25, see Blucher v. National Bank of Baltimore, 151 Md. 514, 135 Atl. 383, 49
A. L. R. 1366 (1926) ; Merchants Bank v. Nissen, 46 S. D. 121, 19o N. W. 1014 (922) ; cf.
cases cited in BRANNAN, supra at 386 et seq.
"Beutel, op. cit. supra note 8.
'These codes have been adopted in seventeen states during the last two years. See:
Idaho, Laws of 193r , c. 6o; Illinois, Laws of 193, p. 671; Indiana, Acts of 1929, c. 64, p.
514; Kentucky, Acts of 1930, c. 13; Maryland, Laws of 1929, c. 454; Michigan, Public Acts
of 1931, No. 240; Alissouri, Laws of 1929, p. 2o5; New Jersey, Laws of 1929, c. 270; New
Mexico, Stats. of 1929 (Courtright) art. 13; Laws of New Jersey, 1929, c. 589; Oregon,
Laws of 1931, c. 138; Pennsylvania, Act I98 of 1931; South Carolina, Acts of I93O, No. 822;
Washington, Laws of 1929, c. 203; West Virginia, Act of I931, c. 15; Wisconsin, Stats. of
1929, c. 220.15; Wyoming, Sess. Laws of 1931, c. 74.
1 Sec. 2 of the Pennsylvania Act . . . "where an item is deposited or received for
collection, the bank of deposit shall be agent of the depositor for its collection." Act 198 of
1931 (the italics are the present writer's). This section prevents the bank from being a
holder in due course, which is clearly the law under §§ 25, 52 and 57. Other portions of the
act create totally new rights in regard to the collection and restrictive indorsements, see §§ 4
to 13.
" See Beutel, op. cit. supra note 8, at n. 15; cf. also ibid. n. 12 to n. 14.
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From the point of view of legal theory it is difficult to understand why
the collection of negotiable instruments by banks is not properly part of the
Negotiable Instruments Law; or why bankers should be governed by rules
different from those applied to other similar commercial transactions. But
the Commission on Uniform Laws, for practical reasons, seems committed
to this policy from which far-reaching results are certain to flow.
The growth of these separate laws covering subsidiary business prob-
lems closely related to and, as a matter of law, overlapping the Negotiable
Instruments Act is raising an extremely difficult problem which must be faced
in the near future. In the light of this movement toward functionalizing
the law for various types of business, it seems useless to amend the N.I.L.
until there is a crystallization of these new laws, and some definite under-
standing of the border lines between and the proper fields of the statutes.
The interplay of these new codes is bound to cause confusion which must
ultimately result in a recodification in which all of these closely related com-
mercial laws are joined in one uniform commercial code.
Foreign commercial codes with totally different requisites of negotia-
bility from our own are also causing some difficulty. Since the United States
has suddenly sprung into prominence as the banking center of the world, the
increased interchange of foreign paper is creating a problem whih finds its
solution in a serious movement for the international unification of the law
of negotiable instruments.7 Any attempt at amendment of the act that
overlooks this difficulty seems short-sighted and provincial.
If then, total recodification is certain to become a pressing problem in
the near future, it seems almost futile to make amendments to the present
Negotiable Instruments Law unless there are major defects in the Act which
must be remedied at once.
Are There Any Major Difficulties With the Negotiable Instruments Law?
One of the major criticisms of the Act has been that it is unnecessarily
broad. Unlike the English Act, the codifiers chose to cover the whole field
of negotiable paper and have excluded either by necessary inference or direct
prohibition the negotiability of paper not coming within the terms of the Act.
a. Rigidity and Negotiability by Contract. This policy has been criti-
cised because it creates rigidity and prevents the growth of new commercial
paper. The proposed amendments, mentioned above,7 2 to stctions i to 6 are
calculated to correct this difficulty by allowing bankers, brokers, merchants,
etc., to create their own types of negotiable instruments. It should be noted,
however, that the formal requisites of negotiable instruments are necessarily
"See Uniform Bills of Exchange Law (1912) 28 BANKING L. 3. 382; Hudson and
Feller, International Unification of Laws Concerning Bills of Exchange (1931) 44 HARv.
L. REV. 333.
7 See supra note 20.
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arbitrary and a certain amount of rigidity is highly desirable. The Act was
adopted to bring about commercial and legal certainty in this respect, so that
the maker, payee, indorser, and holder might be assured of his rights by the
use of an established form. It would be unfortunate indeed to let down the
bars to all kinds of instruments simply because commercial practice has found
it desirable to have a few types of paper on the border line of negotiability
treated as negotiable. Neither is it entirely clear that a great hardship to
business results from excluding from negotiability some of the paper which
passes current in the business world. The only advantage of negotiability
over non-negotiability is that the purchaser from a thief is protected. Claims
of legal and equitable title and defenses may be cut off by estoppel., 3
Another major problem closely allied to and growing out of this diffi-
culty is the problem of negotiability by contract. Those desiring amend-
ments to the Act have suggested that the parties should be allowed to make
any type of instrument that they desire negotiable by mere agreement, but
no amendment has yet been forthcoming which would accomplish this result;
neither is it clear that negotiability by contract is entirely excluded by the
Act especially in light of the analogy offered by section 5, subsection 3, which
reads as follows:
"But the negotiable character of an instrument otherwise negotiable
is not affected by a provision which: . . .
(4) Waives the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or
protection of the obligor."
However, the problem of negotiability by contract involves certain major
considerations of policy which should not be hastily decided. For example,
the small borrower who approaches his banker, broker or loan dealer is not
in a condition to contract freely. If negotiability by contract were allowed,
either by repeal of the prohibitory sections of the present Act or by some new
form of amendment, these small borrowers would be at the mercy of unscru-
pulous members of the creditor class who could make any sort of contract
negotiable by simply inserting a provision to that effect in the printed form.
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The present Act draws a very nice line between the type of burdensome
subsidiary contract of this nature which will or will not be allowed.7'
Viewed in this light the sections prohibiting negotiability of instruments
' See CONTRAcTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 174; Hopple v. Clearland Dis-
count Co., 2.5 Ohio App. 138, 157 N. E. 414 (927) ; Union Trust Co. v. Oberg, 214 N. Y.
517, 1o8 N. E. Sog (1915) ; Goodwin v. Roberts, i A. C. 476 (1876) ; Note (1924) 33 YALE
L. ]. 302; Kelly v. Universal Oil Supply Co., 65 Cal. App. 493, 224 Pac. 261 (1924). Where
real commercial difficulties have developed from unique paper, legislatures have been quick
to pass remedial statutes. See N. Y. Laws of 1926, c. 704, PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 260-
262, Note (1926) 12 CORN. L. Q 97, Note (1926) 26 COL. L. Rv. 884; N. Y. PERsoNAL
PROPERTY LAw (193o) art. 8, §§260-262, Note (1930) 40 YALE L. J. p61.
¢' See the excellent comments on this aspect of our social and legal order by Llewellyn,
What Price Contract (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 704, 731 et seq.
5 Cf. N. I. L. §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 63, 68, 132, 141, 162.
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containing certain types of promises are meeting a great social need. On the
other hand, the loans made by great corporations, municipalities and other
businesses having the constant advice of legal experts need no such protec-
tion. There is no reason why any sort of promise in a corporate bond should
not be made negotiable by contract if it meets commercial convenience, pro-
tects innocent purchasers, and if the parties who deal on equal footing so
desire.76
The negotiability of collateral securities such as mortgages, 77 pledges,
and the like, which has caused a tremendous amount of confusion in the
courts, also involves these dual considerations of policy. So also the proposed
amendments to sections 2, 3 and 5 78 liberalizing the negotiability of instru-
ments containing references to collateral are influenced largely by corporate
considerations 79 and if enacted in the present form they are likely to work
great hardships on the individual debtor.
It is submitted that the present Act adopts the proper policy toward the
small borrower. The difficulties of the larger corporations can best be cor-
rected by a new corporate securities act which, following the present policy
of the Commission, might be recommended as a separate enactment or as
Title 5 of the present Negotiable Instruments Law, and so retained until
recodification of the entire field of commercial law is undertaken.
"' It may be that the courts already have drawr this distinction between individual and
corporate contracts. Cf. American Nat. Banlq v. Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376
(1923); Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N. Y. 263, 164 N. E. 45 (1928).
See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 489 et seq.
Sec. 2. "The sum payable is a sum certain . . . although it is to be paid: (6) With
taxes, insurances or other charges relative to the instrument, the indebtedness evidenced by
it, or the security for it."
Sec. 3, I. "An unqualified order or promise is unconditional.. . though coupled
with:
(c) A statement of, or a reference to a separate writing for a statement of, the holder's
rights concerning any security for the instrument.
2. it the following cases the expression of particular conditions or a summary thereof
with a reference to a separate writing for a full statement of such conditions shall not render
the instrument n-on-negotiable:
(a) Where the instrument is issued and shown on its face to be issued as one of a series,
and conditions are placed in the interests of the holders as a group upon enforcement by in-
dizidual holders;
(b) Where the instrument is issued by a government or governmental agency and pay-
ment is limited to the proceeds of particular described taxes, assessments, or similar sources
of revenue;
(c) Where the instrument is issued by an unincorporated business organization, or by
the representatives of an estate, and payment is limited to the particular fund constituted by
the entire assets of such unincorporated business organization or estate."
Sec. 5. "The negotiable character of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected
by a provision which:
(s) Contains a promise to do any act or make any payment in addition to the payment
of the instrument, even though such gdditional promise be not itself negotiable, provided the
additional act or payment promised is apparently intended only to give or maintain security
for the payment of the instrument or to secure to the holder the full realization of the pay-
inent called for by the instrument free of expenses ou taxes!' PROGRAM OF NAT. CoNF. OF
COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1931) 23-25.
' See Professor Chafee's excellent suggestion on this point, BRANNAN, op. cit. supra
note 2, Preface vi.
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b. Difficulties of Collection, Payment and Acceptances. A number of
major difficulties of the present Act have been suggested by Professor
Chafee, s0 the most important of which deal with problems in the field of
banking. There is considerable difficulty arising out of the collection of
instruments under restrictive indorsements; s i the nature of an indorsement
"for deposit", "pay to any bank or banker", etc., and the duties of the collect-
ing banks thereunder.1
2
A partial solution of these problems has already been attempted by bank
collection codes in the various states and it seems that the entire subject
should be covered in the new Uniform Bank Collection Code.8 3 So also the
questions of the right of the collecting bank to send an instrument direct to
the drawee, the liability of a paying bank for holding paper beyond the speci-
fied time and payment under mistake; ninety per cent. or more of these prob-
lems arise in the banking business, and as a matter of legal analysis all fall
as much in the field of bank collections as they do in the subject of negotiable
instruments. Since the Commission is now attempting to frame a new bank
collection code it would be much better to solve all these problems in that
code and leave the Negotiable Instruments Act as it is where non-banking
problems are affected.
Conclusion
It is perhaps unfortunate that all of these problems cannot be solved at
once and reduced to one unified code. But, as long as we are committed to
the theory of partial codification, minor amendments in the present Act
should not be attempted when, as a practical matter, they can be solved as
well in new and related acts. As soon as the whole field of commercial law,
and commercial paper in particular, has become so crystallized that the
statutes can be brought together in a uniform commercial code, all should be
thoroughly revised. At the present time the practical dangers that amend-
ments may result in further conflict in theories of interpretation, unsatisfac-
tory decisions and in discredit of the entire movement for uniform law, far
outweigh any theoretical advantages that may be gained from sporadic
changes. For these reasons it is submitted that the Negotiable Instruments
Law should not be amended until greater defects appear or until complete
recodification becomes necessary.
"See ibid. v to vii.
81 It has been objected that under the wording of § 37 a trustee to whom an instrument
has been indorsed in trust cannot be a holder in due course, see ibid. 314, 319 et seq.; but see
Atlantic City Nat. Bank v. Commercial Lumber Co., 155 Ad. 762 (N. J. 1931) where a
contrary result was achieved under the act. It seems also that this interpretation can be
reached when §§ 36, 37, 47 and 191 are read together without doing damage to the present
verbiage of those sections. At any rate the case is not of sufficient importance or frequency
to warrant a separate amendment to the act.
' The fact that bank collection codes have been passed in seventeen states in the last
three years, see supra note 68, is conclusive evidence Of the great commercial unrest in this
field.
" See PROGRAM~ OF NAT. CONF. OF COaMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1931) 57 to 81.
